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COMPUTER COPYRIGHT PROTECTION NARRows AS VIDEO GAME
GIANTS BATTLE IN Atari v. Nintendo
INTRODUCTION
One out of every three households in the United States has one, and
the next version will cost only $49.95. What is it? The Nintendo home
video game system.' Since its introduction in 1985, the Nintendo En-
tertainment System (NES) has become the number one video game sys-
tem in the world.2 Video games represent only one facet of the computer
industry, which has fostered tremendous advances in technological and
economic growth in the past twenty-five years.3 As a result of this expan-
sion, the United States has witnessed a growing number of intellectual
property disputes. 4 Today, industry leaders operate in fear of litigation
over infringement of patents and copyrights, and of unfair business prac-
tices which may deny risk-taking companies the benefits of their creativ-
ity.5 Although copyright laws do protect computer programs,6 a recent
lawsuit involving two video game giants suggests that this protection has
been narrowed.
7
In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,8 the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit sustained a preliminary injunction, enjoining
Atari Games Corporation (Atari) from infringing Nintendo's copyright of
its 10NES computer program. 9 The court addressed the extent of protec-
tion given to a computer program and attempted to clarify to what extent
a programmer may and may not use another's work to write a program.
1. More Can Buy the Most Popular Video Game System in History; 8-bit NES Gets New Chassis
and Price Tag Below $50, BusiNrss WRE, June 3, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
BWIRE File.
2. Nintendo has sold a total of 60 million hardware units worldwide, and occupies a 99
percent share of the 8-bit market in the U.S. In 1992, the NES accounted for $2.7 million in
hardware sales and almost $1 billion in software sales. Id.
3. In the mid 1960s, sales of computer programs generated approximately $250 million
in annual sales. COMPUTER SCIENCE AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, INTELLECrUAL PROPERTY ISSUES IN SOFTWARE vii (1991) [hereinafter "CSTB"]. Since
then, the number of U.S. software firms has quadrupled, generating tens of billions of dollars
in revenues annually. In 1990, sales of packaged software alone by U.S. firms totaled nearly
$20 billion and occupied more than 40% of the world market. Id. at 3.
4. Computers have even made theft of intelligence easier, since employees can copy
computer files which may contain trade secrets. SeeJolie Solomon et al, The Grand Pilferer?,
NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1993, at 38, 39.
5. CSTB, supra note 3, at ix.
6. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See also 1
MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NntmRe ON COPMIGHT § 2.04[C] (1993).
7. See David R. Ellis, Chips, Locks, and Video Games, FLA. BAR J., July-Aug. 1993, at 75, 79;
Lee T. Gesmer, Decisions May Signify AJudicial Turnabout NAT'L L. J., Jan. 18, 1993, at S2, S4;
PhilipJ. McCabe & William A. Tanenbaum, Copyright Decisions Increase the Value of Patent Protec-
tion for Computer Software, 2 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 2, available in WESTLAW, JLR database,
(1993).
8. 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
9. Id. at 847.
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This Comment examines the court's decision in Atari First, the Com-
ment briefly introduces computer technology to facilitate the discussion.
Second, the Comment explores the doctrines and cases relating to copy-
right law, particularly its development since the 1970s. Third, the Com-
ment explains the facts and the reasoning adopted by the Atari court.
Finally, the Comment analyzes Atar, noting its likely impact on the com-
puter industry in the future.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Introduction to Computer Technology
Computer technology has progressed significantly since the first com-
puter was built in 1944.10 Today, the software" and computer programs
which make the industry so lucrative' 2 are, perhaps, more important than
the computer itself. A computer program is defined by statute as "a set of
statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer
in order to bring about a certain result."1 3 Programmers normally write
software programs in source code, a high-level computer language reada-
ble by humans. 14 Since computers are incapable of understanding com-
mands expressed in source code, the computer contains an assembler or
compiler program which translates the source code into object code15 , a
binary code' 6 which is readable by computers. The computer stores the
object code on disks or silicon chips.
17
The two principle types of computer programs are operating systems
and application systems. 18 An operating system is a series of programs
which manages the internal functions of the computer, while an applica-
tion system is a program which performs tasks for the user. 19 Video game
10. Peter D. Aufrichtig, Note, Copyright Protection for Gomputer Programs in Read Only Mem-
oyy Chips, 11 HoFsTR L. REv. 329, 333 (1982).
11. Software includes "project description and research, source code, object code, pro-
gram documentation, user instructions, and operating manuals." GORDON V. SMITH & Rus.
SELL L. PARR, VALUATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTANGIBLE AssrTs 115 (1989).
12. The computer software industry is a multi-billion dollar business with millions of
users. ANTHONY L. CLAPES, SOFTWARE, COPYRIGHT, AND COMPETITION 19 (1989).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
14. Standard programming languages which are examples of source code are FOR-
TRAN and COBOL. Howard Root, Note, Cppight Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modifi-
cation of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MnN. L. REv. 1264, 1266 (1984). These highevel
languages are powerful because each statement usually performs the same task as several
machine language (object code) instructions. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, CoN-
GRESS, FINDING A BALANCE: COMPUTER SOFTWARE, INrELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE CHALLENGE
OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 130 (1992) [hereinafter "CONGRESS"].
15. Aufrichtig, supra note 10, at 340 n.110.
16. Binary form is a system of numeration consisting of ones and zeroes, each represent-
ing an open or closed circuit in the computer. Root, supra note 14, at 1267 n.16. Inside a
computer, both data and instructions are represented by patterns of electronic signals which
take one of two values, a "1" or a "0." For example, in most computers, the letter "A" is
represented by a pattern of signals which corresponds to "01000001." CONGRESS, supra note
14, at 125.
17. Root, supra note 14, at 1267.
18. Peter S. Menell, An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,
41 STAN. L. Rpv. 1045, 1051 (1989).
19. Id.
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programs are typically application programs.20 In addition, the complex-
ity of many home and arcade video games requires the use of microproces-
sors. A microprocessor is a miniature computer on a single chip 21 within
the computer, which processes information by executing a series of
instructions.
22
Most programmers create software with a "top down design" process.
This process involves defining the problem or function for the program,
decomposing this function by defining the tasks and subtasks for the com-
puter to perform, and writing instructions or commands for the computer
in the form of source code.23 The computer's assembler program then
compiles the instructions, enabling the computer to perform the tasks.
24
Programmers can also reverse this process to obtain source code from a
program on a disk or chip. This process, called "reverse engineering" or
"intermediate copying"25 involves using a "disassembly" program2 6 to
translate object code into source code.27 The programmer then reviews
the code to understand the program's input, output, and functions, and
generates a set of specifications describing the program. 28 A second
programmer then generates a new program using the first programmer's
specifications.2 9 This second programmer works in a "clean room,"30 and
never sees the original code used to create the specifications. 3' Since this
process can eliminate substantial amounts of the time and money compa-
nies normally spend on developing technology, reverse engineering is a




21. E.F.Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F._Supp. 1485, 1488 (D. Minn. 1985).
22. Robert Steinberg, Microcode--Idea or Expression? 9 COMPUTER/L.J. 61, 62 (1989).
Each instruction, provided to the microprocessor by external software or a human program-
mer, is converted into about four microinstructions. Id.
23. See Menell, supra note 18, at 1055. See also Steven R. Englund, Note, Idea, Process, or
Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection of the Struture of Computer Pro-
grams, 88 MIcH. L. Ray. 866, 870 (1990). Programmers frequently use flowcharts to define
the tasks, and then convert the elements of the flowchart into code. Final steps in the pro-
cess of developing programs include debugging, or testing the program for accuracy and
proper function, and documentation of materials that explain the program's functions to the
user. Menell, supra note 18, at 1051.
24. See Aufrichtig, supra note 10, at 341.
25. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 844 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
26. Disassemblers are widely available. CONGRESS, supra note 14, at 147.
27. See id. at 146-50. Decompilation is similar to reverse engineering and is "often char-
acterized as any technique that is used to transform 'machine readable' code into 'human
readable' code." Id. at 148.
28. McCabe & Tanenbaum, supra note 7, at 2.
29. Id.
30. "[C]lean room is a metaphor for a software development workplace uncontaminated
by familiarity with the expression of a competitor's product." CSTB, supra note 3, at 79.
Firms use "clean rooms" as a means to avoid charges of infringement, or at least improve the
chance of prevailing against such charges. Id. at 77.
31. See Walter A. Effross, Lega Risks in Software Protection, NJ. LAwJ., July 12, 1993 at 26,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NJLAWJ File.
32. CSTB, supra note 3, at 78. Reverse engineering is controversial in the industry be-
cause it can result in the original program creator having "his lead time erased, his price
undercut, and his market reduced for the very thing he created." Id. (quoting Howard G.
Figueroa, Vice President, Commercial and Industry Relations, IBM Corp.).
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B. Computer Programs and Copyright Law
1. The Copyright Act of 1976
The U.S. Constitution gives Congress the authority "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au-
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."33 Congress enacted the first copyright law in the United
States in 1790, with revisions enacted in 1831, 1870, 1909,34 and most re-
cently, 1976.35 As of 1974, copyright laws did not specifically cover com-
puter uses. This prompted Congress to form the National Commission on
New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU).3 6 CONTU's
purpose was to study and make recommendations for computer uses. The
CONTU Final Report recommended amendments to the Copyright Act of
1976 (Act), which would make computer programs explicitly copyright-
able to the extent they embody the author's original creation.3 7 In addi-
tion, CONTU recommended that a definition of a computer program be
added to section 101.38 In 1980, Congress adopted most of CONTU's rec-
ommendations, specifically applying the Copyright Act to computer pro-
grams. 39 Computer programs are copyrightable as literary works under
section 101 of the Act;40 however, the Act protects only the expression of
an idea or process, rather than the idea or process itself.41 For protection
of ideas and processes, software developers must look to patent law.
42
33. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
34. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CAN.
5659, 5660.
35. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 101-1010 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
36. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, Tit. II, 88 Stat. 1873.
37. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL
REPORT 1 (1978) [hereinafter "CONTU REPORT"].
38. Id. at 12. CONTU defined a computer program as "a set of statements or instruc-
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."
Id.
39. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10, 94 Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980) (codified as
amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1988)).
40. The Act defines literary works as works, "other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of
the material objects, such as books, periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes,
disks, or cards, in which they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
41. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to
any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988); see also H.R. REP. No. 1476,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) is intended ... to make clear that
... the actual processes or methods embodied in the [computer] program are not within the
scope of the copyright law.").
42. Although computer programs initially were not considered patentable, Gottschalk v.
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) (interpreted as rendering software unpatentable because algo-
rithms not patentable), patent protection was established by the Supreme Court in 1981.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (use of computer program in rubber-curing process
did not render the invention unpatentable). Patent law protects "any new and useful pro-
cess, machine, manufacture or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). In addition, the subject matter of the work must be non-
obvious. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988). Patents provide protection to owners and give the inventor
the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the patented art. Menell, supra
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2. Interpretation of the Act
Shortly after the passage of the Copyright Act of 1976, litigation in-
volving copyright infringement of computer programs began. 43 One of
the first significant cases was Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer
Corp.,4 in which Apple, one of the computer industry's leaders, sued
Franklin, a manufacturer who had designed an "Apple compatible" com-
puter.45 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed the
lower court's denial of a preliminary injunction, and enjoined Franklin
from marketing fourteen infringing computer programs. 4 6 Citing the
CONTU Report, the court held that a computer program is copyrightable
as a literary work, whether expressed in object code or source code.4 7 In
addition, the court reaffirmed that a computer program embedded in a
memory device, such as a chip, meets the Act's requirement of fixation,
and is therefore copyrightable. 48 Finally, the court refused to per se ex-
clude from copyright an operating system program, or a program put to a
utilitarian, or functional, use.
49
3. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy
Although the Act clearly establishes copyright protection for com-
puter programs, the extent of protection is less clear. A major area of
discussion in most copyright infringement cases centers on where to draw
the line on the "gradual sloping beach called the merger of idea and ex-
pression."50 Section 102(b) of the Act clearly precludes protection of
ideas, but many courts have found the line between idea and expression to
be ambiguous. 5 1 Judge Learned Hand, one of the most cited authorities
note 18, at 1074. The number of software related patents awarded has risen from none in
1980 to about 200 annually. CSTB, supra note 3, at 31.
43. Eg., Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003
(N.D. Tex. 1978) (claim of copyright infringement of instruction manuals and input formats
used with computer program); Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. JS&A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp.
1063 (N.D. I1. 1979), aftd 628 F.2d 1038 (7th Cir. 1980) (claim of copyright infringement of
object code).
44. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismisse4 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
45. Id. at 1242-43.
46. Id. at 1242.
47. Id. at 1249; see alsoJohnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d
1173, 1175 (9th Cir. 1989) (source and object code consistently held protected by copyright);
MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAw § 3.6(B) (1989).
48. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249; see also Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685
F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1982) (program embedded in ROM device copyrightable). The Copy-
right Act requires that a work be "fixed in any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
49. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1252 (citing Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc.,
562 F. Supp. 775, 780 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afld, 725 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984)); see also Mazer v.
Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) ("We find nothing in the copyright statute to support the
argument that the intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright bars or
invalidates its registration."); CONTU REPORT, supra note 37, at 21 ("That the words of a
program are used ultimately in the implementation of a process should in no way affect their
copyrightability.").
50. CSTB, supra note 3, at 23; see also, e.g., Frybarger v. International Business Mach.
Corp., 812 F.2d 525, 529-30 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing which features of two similar video
game programs are protected ideas).
51. See, e.g., Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1253.
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on the subject, noted that "[t]he test for infringement of copyright is of
necessity vague."52 In his opinion in Nichols v. Universal Pictures,5" Judge
Hand described an "abstractions" test which separates the idea from the
expression by analyzing the patterns of increasing generality in a written
or dramatic work.5 4 In this "series of abstractions," the work reaches a
point where it is no longer protected because it consists of the idea only.55
Further difficulty in drawing the line between the idea and its expres-
sion arises because many, if not all, computer programs are essentially util-
itarian rather than artistic works. In considering this issue, many courts
have relied upon the rationale of the Baker v. Selden decision. 56 In Baker,
the Court held that a ledger form in an accounting book was not copy-
rightable because the form was necessary and incidental to the method of
accounting. 57 Therefore, the utilitarian nature of the work rendered it
unprotected. Courts have also expressed this idea as the scenes a faire doc-
trine, where expressions that are indispensable in the standard treatment
of an idea are not protected.5 8 Similarly, the court in Apple Computer fo-
cused on whether the idea can be expressed in various modes. If the idea
can only be expressed in one way, the idea and expression "merge" and
copyright protection is unavailable.
59
Another issue in protectable expression is whether protection extends
beyond the literal code in a program. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow
Dental Laboratory, Inc.,6° the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
held that the structure, sequence, and order of a program is protectable as
expression. 6 1 According to the court, a dental laboratory record keeping
program infringed a similar program, which accomplished the same pur-
pose, but was written in a different language. 6 2 Even though the literal
code of the two programs differed, the court found infringement because
52. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
53. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 (1931).
54. Id. at 121.
55. Id.; see also William E. Hilton, Quantifying Originality: A Logical Analysis for Determining
Substantial Similarity in Computer Software Copyright Infringement Actions, 31 IDEA 269, 285-86
(1991) (describing the abstractions analysis).
56. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
57. Id. at 104.
58. Copyright protection cannot "be afforded to elements of expression that necessarily
follow from an idea." Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (no
infringement where idea inseparable from expression of home computer karate game). See
also See v. Durang, 711 F.2d 141, 143 (9th Cir. 1983) (scenes from a play which were "stock
scenes" or those which "flowed necessarily from common unprotectable ideas" not
protected).
59. Apple Computer, Inc., 714 F.2d at 1252. Another court has stated, "at some point in
the process the idea or 'broad and general statement of the purpose' of the program merges
into the expression, the 'smaller and more detailed tasks' necessary to carry out that idea".
E.F. Johnson Co v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1501-02, n.17 (D. Minn. 1985).
See also CONTU REPORT, supra note 37, at 20 ("[W]hen specific instructions, even though
previously copyrighted, are the only and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their
later use by another will not amount to an infringement."); Englund, supra note 23, at 877
n.56 (explaining the merger doctrine).
60. 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987).
61. Id. at 1240.
62. Id.
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the structure and organization of the two programs were substantially simi-
lar.65 Commentators and courts, however, have since criticized the Whelan
decision as being overbroad in the protection it granted computer
programs. 64
The Supreme Court in 1991 significantly narrowed this broad protec-
tion in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co..65 Although Feist
concerned the copyrightability of telephone directory white pages, the
Supreme Court's holding that copyright law did not protect Rural's list-
ings had an impact on software copyrightability as well.66 The Feist Court
rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine, 67 refusing to allow copyright
protection for factual compilations absent the creation of an original work
in the selection and arrangement of pre-existing materials. 68 Although
the Court conceded that factual compilations may possess the originality
required for copyright protection, 69 the Court limited protection "only to
those components of a work that are original to the author."70 The deci-
sion therefore lowered the threshold of protection from Whelan, which
allowed protection for almost every aspect of a program except the broad
idea of running a dental laboratory efficiently. 71 Because computer pro-
grams consist of a number of subroutines and ideas, they normally contain
more than one broad idea. When an idea is broken into component sub-
routines, many aspects of the program are more utilitarian in nature, and
therefore may not be copyrightable. 72 For these reasons, the Feist decision
has allowed software developers more freedom in building on the work
and ideas of others.
73
4. Substantial Similarity
Having determined the parts of a program that are protected by copy-
right, a court must then determine whether the programs are substantially
similar. Different circuits have varied somewhat in their formulation of
tests for substantial similarity. One test is an "iterative" approach, which
63. Id. at 1248.
64. See, e.g., Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 706 (2d Cir. 1992)
(noting Whelan's "outdated appreciation of computer science"); Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Acco-
lade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (criticizing Whelan as simplistic and over-
broad); CLAwFs, supra note 12, at 100 (discussing the immediate criticism of the decision);
Steven W. Lundberg et al., Identifying Uncopyrightable Computer lmplemented Processes and Systems,
9 COMPUTER IAw. April 1992, at 7, 8 (discussing the Whelan court's "misconception" of
processes embodied in computer programs); Menell, supra note 18, at 1082-83 (discussing
increased costs of innovative activity as a result of broad copyright protection).
65. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
66. See generally Philip D. Bartz &Jonathan Band, Feist v. Rural Telephone: The Beginning of
the End of Sojtware Ovesprotection?, 8 COMPUTER LAw. 10 (1991).
67. Some courts had developed the notion "that copyright was a reward for the hard
work that went into compiling facts." Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1291.
68. Id. at 1293 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988)).
69. Id. at 1287.
70. Id. at 1289.
71. See Bartz & Band, supra note 66, at 11.
72. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1525 (9th Cir. 1992) (emphasizing the
essentially utilitarian nature of computer programs).
73. Bartz & Band, supra note 66, at 11.
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was applied in E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of America.74 In that case, the
court characterized the test for substantial similarity as having two
prongs.7 5 The court first required proof that the defendant used the
copyrighted work in preparing a copy. 76 This was established by proof of
access to the work and similarity sufficient to infer use of the copyrighted
work.7 7 Next, the court required that the alleged copy be an iterative pro-
duction, or one produced by an exact duplication of substantial parts of
the copyrighted work.78 The court noted that expert testimony is neces-
sary to analyze the similarities in both prongs of the test, in addition to the
lay observer's impressions of the "total concept and feel" of the two
works.
79
A more sophisticated test which has been used by several circuits, is an
extrinsic/intrinsic test.80 In Whelan, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit discussed this type of two part test for substantial similarity.81
First, by deciding whether the works are sufficiently similar, the trier of
fact must establish that the alleged infringer used the copyrighted work.
In applying the "extrinsic" or objective test, expert testimony may be used
to assist the fact-finder.8 2 Next, the trier of fact applied the "intrinsic" or
subjective part of the test to determine whether the copying was illicit, as
viewed from the lay observer's perspective, without expert testimony.
83
The intrinsic part of the test has also been characterized as capturing the
"concept and feel" of the works, similar to the iterative approach.8 4 This
test has also been used in the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.
8 5
A variation, used in the First and Seventh Circuits, applies only the
second prong of the extrinsic/intrinsic test. This is known as the "ordi-
nary observer" test. Here, the inquiry the court makes is whether an ordi-
nary, reasonable person would conclude that the protected part of a work
had been copied.
8 6
74. 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492-93 (D. Minn 1985) (citing Williams Elecs. v. Artic Int'l, Inc.,
685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) as following the iterative approach).
75. Id. at 1492.




80. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Prods., Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 291 (3d Cir. 1991);
Moore v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 972 F.2d 939, 945 (8th Cir. 1992).
81. The court discusses this bifurcated approach and hints that it is the law in the Third
Circuit but does not adopt or utilize the test in Whelan itself. Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental
Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 (3rd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (describing the
test as set forth in Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1232. See aLso Sid & Marty Kroft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.,
562 F.2d 1157, 1164-65 (9th Cir. 1977) (discussing the extrinsic and intrinsic tests of substan-
tial similarity).
84. See Dawson v. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d 731, 733 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
981 (1990).
85. See, e.g., id. at 732-33 (two part intrinsic/extrinsic test); Data E. USA, Inc. v. Epyx,
Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) (two step test for substantial similarity in the Ninth
Circuit).
86. See Concrete Machinery Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 607 (1st
Cir. 1988) (applying second part of test from Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946));
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More recently, in Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
87
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit utilized a three part test
for substantial similarity, consisting of an abstraction, filtration, and com-
parison analysis.88 The first part usesJudge Hand's abstractions analysis. 89
After determining the various levels of abstractions, the trier of fact must
filter unprotectable material from the work. Standard techniques in the
public domain are excluded", as well as portions of the program neces-
sary because of structural9 ' or external factors.9 2 The court characterized
this filtration process as a method of defining the scope of copyright pro-
tection.93 This process ideally leaves a "core of protectable material."
94
The final step involves comparing this core of protectable expression in
the copyrighted work to the alleged copy for substantial similarities.
95
This test somewhat limits copyright protection because by protecting only
a core of expression, very little of the work may be left protected. The
court's rationale for such limitation, however, emphasized a desire to cre-
ate incentive for future program development and noted the ultimate aim
of copyright law in stimulating artistic creativity for the public good.96
This three part test has also been adopted by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit since the decision in Computer Associates International.
97
In general, most of the circuit courts of appeal seem to be shifting away
from the test set forth in Whelan.98
5. Fair Use Exception
Even if a court finds substantial similarity under one of the above
tests, copyright law permits some degree of copying under statutory excep-
tions.99 One such exception is the traditional privilege of other authors
for "fair use" of the copyrighted work. 10 0 In Harper & Row Publishers v.
Evans Newton Inc. v. Chicago Systems Software, 793 F.2d 889, 895 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 949 (1986); Atari, Inc. v. North Amer. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982).
87. 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992).
88. Id. at 706-11.
89. Id. at 706-07. See also supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
90. Computer Assocs. Int'4 892 F.2d at 710.
91. Id. at 707-09.
92. Id. at 707-710.
93. Id. at 707.
94. Id. (citing 3 NIMMER, supra note 6, § 13.03(F)(5), at 13-72).
95. Id. at 710-11.
96. Id. at 711 (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975) (Stewart, J.)).
97. See Autoskill Inc. v. National Educ. Support Sys., Inc., 994 F.2d 1476, 1490 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 114 S.CL 307 (1993).
98. See Lee T. Gesmer, Decisions May Signify a Judicial Turnabout, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 19,
1993, at S2, S3 (indicating that Whelan is no longer followed in the Second, Fifth, Ninth and
Federal Circuits and predicting other circuits will follow Computer Associates InternationaL)
99. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-120 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (limitations on exclusive rights).
100. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988). "[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright." 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1988). Factors which are considered in determining whether a use is fair include:
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Nation Enterprises,1 0' the Supreme Court held that a magazine's unauthor-
ized publishing of verbatim quotes from President Ford's memoirs was not
a fair use because it deprived the copyright owners of their valuable right
to first publication.' 0 2 The Court stated that when a publication is used
commercially for profit rather than for a nonprofit educational use, a
court will less likely find a fair use. 10 3 The issue of whether a use is fair,
however, requires a case-by-case analysis.' 0 4 In Sega Entrprises v. Accolade,
Inc.,10 5 the court did not allow reverse engineering of a computer pro-
gram, stating that such a use "for financial gain and ... aimed at the
creation of a competitive product" was not fair use of copyrighted
software. 10 6 This was an important issue which the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit would consider in Atari later the same year.
II. INSTANT CASE
A. Factual History
Nintendo sells the Nintendo Entertainment System (NES), a home
video game system. The system includes a monitor, a console, and con-
trols. To play a game, the user inserts a game cartridge into the console,
thereby creating images on the display.10 7 In order to prevent cartridges
other than Nintendo cartridges from working in the NES, Nintendo
designed a security system called the 1ONES. The console and authorized
game cartridges both contain microprograms, 10 8 which are chips
programmed with the 1ONES. The console contains a master chip which
acts as a lock to the NES. Authorized game cartridges contain a "slave
chip", which acts as a key to the system. When one inserts an authorized
cartridge into the NES, the slave chip "unlocks" the console, allowing the
1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; 2) the nature of the copy-
righted work; 3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a Whole; and 4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.
Id.
101. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
102. Id. at 569.
103. Id. at 562; see also 3 NiMMER, supra note 6, § 13.05(A)(1)(c), at 13-161 to 13-165.
104. H.R. Rep. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 56 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5680.
105. 785 F. Supp. 1392 (N.D. Cal.), affid in part, rev'd in part by Sega Enters. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
106. Id. at 1398. The district court cited legislative history indicating intermediate copy-
ing was not intended by Congress to be a fair use. Id. A month after the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit decided Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832
(Fed. Cir. 1992), however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the
district court's decision on appeal. In that case, Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510
(9th Cir. 1992), the court allowed reverse engineering as a fair use when "disassembly is the
only way to gain access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a copyrighted
computer program and where there is a legitimate reason for seeking such access." Id. at
1527.
107. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 835 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
108. Microprograms are copyrightable as long as the instructions are not completely
functional. Steinberg, supra note 22, at 62.
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user to play the game. An unauthorized game cartridge which sends no
unlocking message to the console will therefore not work in the NES. 1° 9
Beginning in 1986, Atari, one of Nintendo's competitors in the home
video game market, attempted to replicate the 10NES system."10 Atari en-
gineers unsuccessfully attempted to understand the 10NES program by
monitoring communication between the chips.1 11 They also analyzed the
chips by chemically peeling layers from NES chips and microscopically ex-
amining the object code.1 12 Having failed in these efforts, Atari became a
Nintendo licensee in 1987.113 Atari paid Nintendo to insert Atari's games
into 1ONES cartridges, allowing Atari to market its games to Nintendo con-
sole owners.'
1 4
Apparently dissatisfied with this arrangement, Atari attempted to deci-
pher the 1ONES code again. In early 1988, Atari's attorney lied to the
Copyright Office and wrongfully obtained a copy of the 1ONES pro-
gram.1 15 The attorney stated in his application to the Copyright Office
that Atari was a defendant in an infringement action and needed a copy
for that litigation.' 16 Upon obtaining the source code from the Copyright
Office, Atari engineers were able to correct errors in the transcription of
the object code from their microscopic analysis of peeled chips.' 7 In this
way, the wrongfully obtained copy from the Copyright Office permitted
Atari to replicate the 1ONES object code.
11 8
Atari then developed its own program called the Rabbit program,
which performed the same function as the 1ONES. Although the Rabbit
used a different microprocessor and was programmed in a different lan-
guage, the two programs generated functionally indistinguishable signals.
The Rabbit program therefore gave Atari access to Nintendo console own-
ers, in breach of its licensing agreement.' 1 9
In December 1988, Atari sued Nintendo for unfair competition, Sher-
man Act violations, and patent infringement.' 20 Then, in November
1989, Nintendo sued Atari for unfair competition, patent infringement,
copyright infringement, and trade secret violations. The United States
District Court for the Northern District of California consolidated the two
cases, preliminarily enjoining Atari from exploiting Nintendo's
program.'
2 1
109. Atar/, 975 F.2d at 836.




114. Atar/ 975 F.2d at 836.
115. Id.
116. The regulations of the Copyright Office permit reproduction of a copy if the Office
receives a written request from an attorney, on behalf of either the plaintiff or the defendant,
in connection with actual or prospective litigation involving the copyrighted work. 37 C.F.R.
§ 201.2(d)(2) (1992).
117. Atari, 975 F.2d at 836.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 836-37.
120. Id. at 837.
121. Id. at 835.
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B. Opinion of the Court
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit sustained
the preliminary injunction, enjoining Atari from marketing cartridges
containing the Rabbit program. The court concluded that Nintendo
demonstrated the 1ONES program contained at least some protected ex-
pression, 12 2 and that Atari made unauthorized verbatim copies from the
Copyright Office.12 3 In addition, the court ruled that Nintendo showed a
likelihood of success in proving that Atari infringed the 1ONES copyright
by copying the source code from the Copyright Office, and that the Rabbit
program was substantially similar to the 1ONES. 124 Finally, the court
found that Nintendo was likely to overcome Atari's assertion of the de-
fense of copyright misuse.
125
The court based its analysis on traditional requirements for infringe-
ment cases, applying law from the Ninth Circuit. Under this law,
Nintendo had to show 1) ownership of the 1ONES program, and 2) copy-
ing of protected expression, either by verbatim copying, or by Atari having
access to the copyrighted work, plus substantial similarity between the
works.
1 26
The first step required the court to identify the protected expression
in the lONES program. The court did this by usingJudge Hand's abstrac-
tions test 12 7 and the filtration component of Computer Associates Interna-
tionaL128 The court held that the IONES program contained protectable
expression, even though it involved the process of unlocking the sys-
tem. 12 9 Nintendo's use of arbitrary instructions arranged in a unique se-
quence to create an arbitrary data stream was found to be protected after
the filtration process. External factors did not dictate the design, and the
expression was not taken from the public domain.13 0 In addition, the ex-
pression of the data stream did not merge with the idea because alternate
expressions were available, as shown by expert testimony of different ways
to generate it.
131
Next, the court examined whether Atari had infringed by making ver-
batim copies from the source code from the Copyright Office.' 3 2 The
court concluded that the copies from the Copyright Office, which Atari
122. Id. at 840.
123. Id. at 841-42.
124. Id. at 847.
125. Id. Copyright misuse is a defense which "bars a culpable plaintiff from prevailing on
an action for infringement of the misused copyright." Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911
F.2d 970, 972 (4th Cir. 1990) (explaining copyright misuse defense as inherent in copyright
law).
126. Atari, 975 F.2d at 837-38.
127. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 84-94 and accompanying text.
129. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
130. Id. at 840.
131. Id. In a later opinion, Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 1993 WL 214886
(N.D. Cal. 1993), the court emphasized that the data stream itself was not protected, only the
unique expression. Id. at *9.
132. Id. at 840.
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obtained in violation of its regulations,
133 were unauthorized copies.13 4
Since reproducing an unauthorized copy from the Copyright Office vio-
lates the Copyright Act, the court found that Nintendo was likely to show
infringement.
1 3 5
In dicta, the court said that reverse engineering by Atari to under-
stand the unprotected ideas in the 1ONES program was a fair use.13 6 The
court proceeded to say, however, that fair use does not extend to interme-
diate copying for commercial exploitation of protected expression.
13 7
Furthermore, the court stated that in order to invoke the fair use excep-
tion, the user of the copyrighted work must have an authorized copy.
1 38
Since Atari had an unauthorized copy of the program and used reverse
engineering beyond that necessary to understand the program, the court
refused to find Atari within the fair use exception.13 9 In doing so, the
court emphasized the importance of copyright in balancing authors' inter-
ests in controlling and exploiting their works, and society's interest in the
free flow of information and ideas. 14° According to the court, patent law
is the appropriate medium to protect one's ideas, and such protection
cannot be acquired by writing a program "in an unintelligible format and
asserting copyright infringement against those who try to understand" the
idea or process.
14 1
The court used the two step, extrinsic and intrinsic analysis for sub-
stantial similarity. 142 Stating that expert testimony is appropriate to dis-
cern similarities in the two programs, the court noted several unnecessary
instructions in the Rabbit program. This indicated strong evidence of
copying, rather than independent creation. 143 The court therefore found
the two programs substantially similar.
144
Finally, the court rejected Atari's copyright misuse defense. The
court drew a parallel to the patent misuse defense and acknowledged that
the copyright misuse defense would be appropriate under certain circum-
stances. 14 5 Atari, however, was not allowed to raise the equitable defense
of copyright misuse because it had "unclean hands" as a result of its attor-
ney lying to the Copyright Office.
146
133. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
134. Atari, 975 F.2d at 841.
135. Id. at 842.
136. Id. at 843-44.
137. Id. at 843-44.
138. Id. at 843.
139. Id. at 844.
140. Id. at 842 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429-
30 (1984)).
141. Atar, 975 F.2d at 842.
142. Id. at 844.
143. Id. at 845.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 846.
146. Id.
1994]
DENVER UNIVERS/TY LAW REVIEW
III. ANALYSIS
A. Reverse Engineering
One of the most significant aspects in the Atari opinion is the dicta
regarding reverse engineering. The statement that reverse engineering is
a fair use to the extent it is necessary to understand a program 14 7 could
have a significant effect on the computer industry. Although courts have
previously refused to allow reverse engineering as a fair use, 148 the court
in Atari expressly allowed reverse engineering to discern the unprotected
ideas of a work.1 49 The court restricted this use somewhat, requiring the
use be of an authorized copy and that it not be used to profit through
commercial exploitation. 150 Although allowing reverse engineering nar-
rows the scope of copyright protection for computer software, the court's
rationale is logical, and the decision corresponds with the purposes of
copyrights as articulated in the U.S. Constitution.
The purpose of copyright law, as stated in the U.S. Constitution, is to
promote science and encourage innovation and creativity. 151 Ideally, the
extent of protection for computer software involves a balance of public
and private interests. 152 Since computer programs are often highly utilita-
rian works, they may require less protection to promote the progress of
technological advances in the public interest. Because technological de-
velopment involves sequential improvements on existing knowledge,
scientists and entrepreneurs often fear that business and legal constraints
will slow the progress that comes from shared learning. l5 3 The computer
industry, however, is a highly profitable business,' 5 4 and economic inter-
ests of software developers are important as well.
For software developers, the cost of creating programs is high com-
pared to the cost of producing copies of existing programs. 155 Develop-
147. Id. at 843.
148. Id. at 844; see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 1392, 1398 (N.D.
Cal. 1992). In Sega, the court argued against allowing reverse engineering as a fair use, since
"[a] competitor who reverse engineers a copyrighted computer program... [does so with the
sole purpose of inducing] the public to purchase his work rather than the original thereby
eliminating the market for the original." Id. Chemical peeling of microchips or program-
ming in a clean room, however, was said to be acceptable as a fair use. Id. at 1399.
149. "Atari did not violate Nintendo's copyright by deprocessing computer chips in
Atari's rightful possession. Atari could lawfully deprocess Nintendo's 10NES chips to learn
their unprotected ideas and processes." Aar, 975 F.2d at 844.
150. Id. at 843.
151. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also CSTB, supra note 3, at 17. Copyright law has
two goals: 1) to encourage disclosure of intellectual ideas to the public, and 2) to protect
intellectual property capable of reproduction. Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program
Object Code 96 HAtv. L. REv. 1723, 1739 (1983).
152. Balancing of public and private interests involves a need to protect innovation and a
need to share ideas in order to encourage compatibility of computer systems. CSTB, supra
note 3, at 17. Protection which is too liberal results in monopolies and inhibits creativity.
Protection which is too conservative also discourages innovation because creative efforts are
easily copied. Menell, supra note 18, at 1047-48.
153. CSTB, supra note 3, at ix.
154. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
155. Both magnetic and hardcopy (on paper) forms of programs can be easily dupli-
cated. CIAPEs, supra note 12, at 23. Like most forms of intellectual property, developing
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ers, therefore, need some degree of protection to avoid a "free rider"
problem,' 5 6 where competitors use reverse engineering or copying to
avoid development costs. Nevertheless, the benefits of protection must
outweigh the costs. Over-broad protection may cause a risk of monopo-
lies, transaction costs from licensing, copyright and patent agreements,
and costs of litigating infringement claims. 157 In addition, society pays a
price when protection is too broad, since progress may be inhibited as a
result of developers having to waste time and resources on research and
development which has already been done by other companies.
1 58
Software developers, however, derive benefits from copyright protection,
since it allows them to freely market their innovative ideas without fear of
others profiting from their efforts. In this way, copyright protection en-
courages innovation. Determining what is too much or too little protec-
tion is therefore difficult, but the bottom line is that the costs to society
clearly outweigh the economic benefits companies receive when protec-
tion becomes too broad.
Allowing software programmers to reverse engineer another's work in
order to understand the technology of the ideas and processes does not
allow them a "free ride." Rather, a company must spend a significant
amount of time and resources to decompile a program, as Atari's exten-
sive reverse engineering efforts and difficulty in deciphering Nintendo's
code illustrates. 159 Although allowing reverse engineering as a fair use
may encourage development of more "security systems" like the lONES as
developers attempt to protect their programs, this is not necessarily a neg-
ative effect. On the contrary, it may foster new and creative methods of
programming and decompiling code. In addition, reverse engineering
encourages innovation by allowing programmers to understand previous
work and build upon it. As the court in Atari states, "[w]here the infringe-
ment is small in relation to the new work created, the fair user is profiting
largely from his own creative efforts rather than free-riding on another's
work."'1
60
An important limitation on reverse engineering is that it not be used
"to exploit commercially or otherwise misappropriate protected expres-
computer programs involves most expenditure of resources in the development stage (de-
sign and implementation). "Reproducing it is trivial. Building it... is the hard part." CSTB,
supra note 3, at 44 (quoting Randall Davis). See aLso Aufrichtig, supra note 10, at 342 (cost of
developing programs is great); Note, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96
HitAv. L. Rav. 1723 (1983) (copying is easy and inexpensive).
156. Closely related to the free rider problem is the "public goods" problem, which is
inherent in markets for intellectual property. The problem stems from the difficulty in ex-
cluding anyone from using the work who did not pay for it, and from nonrivalrous competi-
tion-additional consumers do not deplete the quantity available to others. A means to
correct this problem is to provide limited protection to works containing original expression.
This increases the reward to those engaged in intellectual work, and therefore encourages
inventive activity. Menell, supra note 18, at 1059.
157. Id. at 1065.
158. See id. at 1083.
159. Atari Games Corp. v Nintendo of Am. Inc., 1991 WL 57304, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
160. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (quoting
New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Pub. Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 307 n. 6 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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sion." 16 1 A problem with the rationale of this argument is that any com-
pany using reverse engineering to understand a work is probably involved
in ultimately creating their own product for financial gain. The court in
Sega has addressed this issue since Atari however, it stated that an analysis
considering only production of a competing product is too simple.'
62
Rather, the court "must consider other aspects of 'the purpose and charac-
ter of the use' as well."163 Sega indicates that other factors which increase
the likelihood of a court finding a fair use include: a direct purpose of
simply studying the functional requirements of a program; a public bene-
fit derived from the use, such as increased compatibility' 64 or increased
amount of creative programs available to the public; and a purpose of
competing in the market by developing programs compatible with other
systems. 165 These are significant qualifications which help justify allowing
reverse engineering.
B. Protectable Expression and Substantial Similarity
In ascertaining protected expression and substantial similarity, the
court in Atari logically applied traditional standards. Although these stan-
dards continue to be ambiguous, the court provided some helpful guide-
lines. The court adopted the tests used in the Ninth Circuit for both
issues, along with some aspects of the test used in the Second Circuit for
substantial similanty. 66 Among the factors the court used to separate the
idea from the expression are similarities beyond that necessary for the
function of the program, 16 7 or common errors in the program that indi-
cate copying.168 Furthermore, in discerning protected expression, the
court also combined aspects ofJudge Hand's abstractions analysis and the
filtration analysis used in the Second Circuit to provide a method for dis-
tinguishing protected aspects of a program. 169 For instance, the court
granted protection to a unique and creative sequence of code instructions
which Nintendo created independently. 170 In addition, because no exter-
nal factors dictated code instructions to make the sequence necessary to
the function of the program, the court granted copyright protection.
17 1
The court also considered programs not in the public domain as copy-
rightable, 172 as well as a particular expression of an idea, where alternate
161. Id. at 844.
162. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522 (9th Cir. 1992).
163. Id.
164. Compatibility in computer systems is considered by many to be an important goal in
the software industry. Others assert, however, that the argument for compatibility is a "guise
for abetting widespread copying of successful products." CSTB, supra note 3, at 73.
165. Sga, 977 F.2d at 1522-23. In addition, Sega emphasizes that where several ways of
expressing an idea exist, the creative expression will be protected, as in Atari Where the
expression is purely functional of the idea, however, it will not be protected. Id. at 1524 n.7.
166. Atar, 975 F.2d at 845.
167. Id.
168. Id. (citing M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 446 (4th Cir. 1986)).
169. Atari, 975 F.2d at 839.
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expressions of the idea or process are available. 7  These ideas are tradi-
tional in the development of copyright law. 174 In general, the Atari opin-
ion indicates a shift in the analysis of copyright protection from that of
Whelan' 7 5 to that of Computer Associates International17 6 This analysis pro-
vides less protection, but it may be the most appropriate for computer
programs.
C. Implications for the Software Business
Due to this narrowing of protection for computer programs, one con-
sequence of Atari may be that software developers will continue to attempt
to protect their products with methods other than copyright. Other possi-
ble methods are patent, trade secret, misappropriation, and trademark
law. 177 Although CONTU thought copyright the best medium, 178 consid-
ering the utilitarian characteristics of most computer programs, patent law
may be more appropriate today. 179 Due to rapid technological advances
in the industry, however, patent protection is not viable for most pro-
grams.'8 0 Patent law requires a novel, non-obvious innovation, compared
to the less stringent originality requirement of copyright law, and the pro-
cess for obtaining a patent is much more costly and time consuming than
for a copyright. 8 1 Obtaining a patent also requires disclosure of the in-
vention to the patent office, which may destroy availability of trade secret
protection.
82
Although patent law is therefore not the solution for most businesses,
several other options exist to protect software, including trade secret, mis-
appropriation, and trademark law. Trade secret law requires that the in-
formation be novel and valuable in the trade or business, and that it be
secret.' 8 3 Most firms utilize this type of protection with license agree-
ments.1 84 One drawback with this option is that a licensee can reverse en-
gineer and reassemble software to a form bearing little resemblance to the
original, which defeats trade secret protection.' 8 5 Another option is mis-
appropriation, a branch of unfair competition.' 8 6 Finally, trademark pro-
173. Id.
174. See supra notes 50-73 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 84-95 and accompanying text.
177. Menell, supra note 18, at 1077.
178. See CONTU Report, supra note 37, at 17.
179. Copyright law is necessarily limited for computer programs because they are utilita-
rian works. See Englund, supra note 23, at 893.
180. Over 90% of computer programs probably fail to meet the non-obvious require-
ment, and are therefore not patentable. 1 DAVID BENDER, COMP=UrR LAw § 3A.02[1] (1993).
181. McCabe & Tanenbaum, supra note 7, at 4. Patents take several years to obtain, and
most computer programs become obsolete before protection is available. Note, supra note
152, at 1743 and notes 149-153. Owners of copyrights are protected for the life of the author
plus 50 years, or 75 years from publication for works created for hire. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a), (c)
(1978). In contrast, patents only protect a work for 17 years. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988).
182. Menell, supra note 18, at 1076.
183. Id. at 1077.
184. CSTB, supra note 3, at 29.
185. Id. at 30.
186. Misappropriation protects collected information. Menell, supra note 18, at 1078.
19941
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
tection may help the developer by protecting the reputation one gains
from introducing a product first.187 Such reputation is potentially valua-
ble, depending on how quickly competitors can reverse engineer and cre-
ate a similar program.
Although all the options for protection have both advantages and dis-
advantages, Atari will probably force software companies to move away
from copyright as a sole means of protection. Due to the lack of availabil-
ity of patents for most software programs and the minimal protection pro-
vided by other options, however, allowing reverse engineering as a fair use
creates a problem for software developers who wish to protect their work.
The court reasonably applied copyright law in Atar/, but the decision fails
to solve the problem of protecting computer software in a way which bal-
ances all interests. Neither copyright law nor patent law ideally suits the
unique characteristics of computer programs as artistic works and utilita-
rian processes.' 8 8 Ultimately, software developers simply need a clearer
picture of the law to provide a better solution to protect their valuable
creative efforts.
CONCLUSION
After Atari, software companies do not necessarily have a clear picture
of copyright law as it applies to their programs. The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit continued the tradition of applying vague stan-
dards in determining protected expression for computer programs. This
area of the law, however, may necessarily remain ambiguous due to the
unique nature of computer software and intellectual property in gen-
eral.' 8 9 More significantly, the Atari decision narrowed copyright protec-
tion available for computer programs1 90 by stating in dicta that reverse
engineering is a fair use to understand the ideas and processes of a pro-
gram. 19 1 In this way, the court has allowed software developers to cut costs
significantly in developing programs to compete with existing pro-
grams. 192 In attempting to balance the interests of society and those of
entrepreneurs and software developers, the court has given developers lit-
tle option but to seek other areas of the law to protect their work. Patent
law is available to protect useful, novel, and non-obvious ideas, but the
time and cost of obtaining patent protection make it an inviable option for
most software developers.193 Thus, while the Atari decision may have pro-
moted the purpose of copyright in allowing the free flow of ideas, allowing
187. Trademark law protects marks used by manufacturers to aid consumers in avoiding
confusion. Id. at 1078, 1081.
188. "Old doctrines and principles are being stretched to unprecedented dimensions to
accommodate developing software copyright issues." David Goldberg & RobertJ. Bernstein,
Confrontation With the Computer Age, N.Y. LAwJ., Sept. 17, 1993 at 3, 29.
189. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
190. See Ellis, supra note 7, at 79.
191. The idea that reverse engineering, or disassembly, is a fair use as a matter of law was
expressly upheld in Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1514 (9th Cir. 1992).
192. See CSTB, supra note 3, at 78.
193. See supra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
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reverse engineering may have created a problem for computer program
developers in protecting their valuable innovations.
Susan E. Dallas

